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INTRODUCTION
Launched in 2005, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is
the first and largest cap-and-trade system of allowances for emitting greenhouse
gases in the world. As such it represents a valuable policy experiment from
which lessons can be drawn.
The European Union has developed the ETS as the cornerstone of its climate
policy. The objective of emissions trading is to provide incentives for businesses
to reduce carbon emissions at the least possible cost. Over time, the ETS drives
investments in low-carbon technologies, leading to further emissions reductions.
Initially the EU ETS was split into two trading phases: a pilot phase from 2005
to 2007 (Phase I), and a mandatory phase from 2008 to 2012 (Phase II), coin-
ciding with the commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. In 2008, a third
phase post-Kyoto was mandated to operate from 2013 to 2020. The objective
is to help the EU to reduce its emissions by at least 20% by 2020 compared to
1990 levels and to increase this target to 30% in the context of an ambitious and
comprehensive international agreement.1
Despite the diverse achievements of the EU ETS so far , the scheme is still far
from having fulfilled its theoretical potential. Although it has been proven that
the scheme led to abatement during the first phase, carbon prices have remained
too low to promote investments in the development, diffusion and deployment
of low-carbon technologies. Yet, if the EU wants to achieve the long-term chal-
lenge of ‘decarbonising’ its economy, a credible and long-term carbon price is
needed to insure green investments. The lack of reliable and verified data for
emission projections and the fear of industry and Member States for the eco-
nomic costs of the scheme led to a first phase with many design shortcomings.
Some of these shortcomings were solved in the second phase but most of them
have remained. In order to address the scheme’s design flaws and, thereby,
improve the credibility of the scheme in its future Phase III, the ETS Directive
was thoroughly revised in 2008.2 The analysis of the revised directive shows that
most of the lessons from the earlier experience have been learned. However,
since this revision, the economic crisis occurred and has greatly undermined the
efficiency of the ETS, changing the political and economic landscape in which
the EU’s climate policy was projected. By reducing industrial production, the
1. What ‘ambitious’ means is still unclear but the EU documents state that an ambitious and comprehen-
sive international agreement should contain comparable reductions to the EU by other developed coun-
tries and appropriate actions by the economically more advanced developing countries based on their
responsibilities and capabilities.
2. Directive 2009/29/EC amending Directive 2003/87/EC, OJ 2009, L 140, pp. 63-87.THE EU’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: ACHIEVEMENTS, KEY LESSONS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
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economic recession has certainly reduced emissions but has also ensured that
carbon prices stay low in the forthcoming years, delaying the necessary shift
towards a low-carbon economy.
In order to prevent Phase III from being rendered ineffective before its start and
in order to ensure the EU ETS’ credibility as an effective means of reducing
emissions, the ETS cap must be unilaterally revised towards an objective of 30%
emission reduction by 2020. This would not only correct the negative conse-
quences of the economic recession on the scheme but would also boost invest-
ment in the development of green technologies.
Besides, the future of the scheme will very much depend on the international
context, which is far from clear. While the negotiations for a global climate
agreement are progressing painfully, the ambition of the EU to link up its ETS
with other trading systems in order to progressively build up an international
global carbon market is very uncertain due to the waving will of external actors.
Developments at the international level have created further uncertainties, hin-
dering investment in green technologies.
Against this background, this paper will analyse the lessons learnt so far from
the EU ETS in order to have a better perspective of its future. After a general
outline of the EU ETS (§ 1) its main achievements will be considered (§ 2). Next,
the various shortcomings of the scheme in its first phase and ongoing second
phase will be analysed (§ 3), followed by a description of the new design fea-
tures of the revised scheme post-2012 (§ 4). Then, it will be assessed how the
shortcomings of the first years’ experience have been taken into account in the
revised ETS scheme as well as how the recession has since then undermined
these improvements, thereby reducing the efficiency of the future scheme (§ 5).
Finally, the lessons learnt from the EU ETS so far and what they tell us on the
future prospects of the scheme will be summarised in a conclusion.
Clémentine D’OULTREMONT
Research Fellow in European Affairs
Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations5
1. The ETS general outline
The EU ETS was established by Directive 2003/873 and entered into force on 1st
January 2005. It covers 11,500 installations in the power and heat generation
sector and in other energy-intensive industrial sectors4, accounting for about
40% of EU’s total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
It is a ‘cap and trade’ system. The idea is to impose a cap or limit on the total
amount of emissions of sectors covered in order to help the EU Member States
to achieve their reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. Theoreti-
cally, the cap creates the scarcity required for firms to trade their pollution
allowances, thereby putting a price on carbon and giving an incentive to eco-
nomically efficient reductions. An allowance represents the right to emit a tonne
of greenhouse gas.5 For each trading period, Member States are required to
establish a National Allocation Plan (NAP) which determines the national cap
on the total amount of allowances and how these allowances will be allocate
each year to the installations covered by the scheme. Each NAP must be
approved by the European Commission.
If an installation emits more than the amount of allowances it received, it has
three main options: purchasing extra allowances from those who pollute less
than their allocated allowances, investing in emissions reductions and selling
freed-up allowances, reducing production and selling freed-up allowances.
Installations will sell their allowances as long as the carbon price exceeds their
marginal abatement costs and inversely.
To fulfil a proportion of their commitments under the ETS, installations also
have the possibility to use two other Kyoto Protocol mechanisms which were
linked to the EU ETS by Directive 2004/016: the Clean Development Mecha-
nism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI). These mechanisms allow installa-
tions to invest in projects to reduce emissions in third countries and use emission
credits generated from these for compliance purposes. The CDM applies to
projects in developing countries whereas JI covers projects in countries that have
committed to emission reductions under the Kyoto Protocol, mainly countries
with economies in transition. The idea behind these mechanisms is to enable
3. OJ 2003, L 275, pp. 32-46.
4. Combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel plants and factories producing cement,
glass, lime, pottery, bricks, pulp and paper. These activities are listed in Annex I of Directive 2003/87.
5. CO2 is the only greenhouse gas concerned for Phase I. In Phase II, emissions of nitrous oxide from the
production of nitric acid were also included.
6. OJ 2004, L 338, pp. 18-23.THE EU’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: ACHIEVEMENTS, KEY LESSONS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
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emissions reductions at the lowest cost while encouraging the transfer of low-
carbon technologies in the host countries.
On the basis of lessons learnt during the first years of experience, the ETS was
heavily revised in 2008 by Directive 2009/29 in order to improve the credibility
of the scheme in its Phase III. In the following sections the achievements and
shortcomings of the ETS so far will be analysed in order to better assess the
revision of the future scheme, considerably undermined by the economic reces-
sion, discussed later.7
2. Achievements of the ETS so far
Considering the lack of experience of the EU with emissions trading before
2005, the huge complexity of the scheme and the time constraint to implement
it7, the achievements of the EU ETS are not negligible. These successes are very
important for the EU to efficiently promote its model as the basis of a potential
future global carbon market.
2.1. Proper functioning of the allowance market
The biggest achievement of the EU ETS is the creation of a functioning allow-
ance market. On a global scale, the EU represented about 73% of the global
turnover in carbon allowances and credits, making it the dominant force in the
global carbon market.8 Since the market has been in operation, it has extended
significantly: 362 million allowances traded in 2005 amounting for € 7.2 bil-
lion, increasing to 1 billion allowances in 2006, 3.1 billion allowances in 20089
and over 6.3 billion allowances in 2009.10 The amount of allowances traded
doubled between 2008 and 2009. Due to this significant increase in the volume
of transactions over 2008 and despite a decrease of the average allowances
prices by 42%11, the total value of allowances increased by 18% in 2009,
amounting to around € 88.7 billion.12 This is to a large extent due to the eco-
nomic and financial crisis which led many businesses to sell their surplus of
allowances to generate cash.
As a market mechanism, the EU ETS has matured quickly. The carbon prices
have responded logically to essential factors like economic growth, energy prices
and weather patterns. This proves that the market is both rational and efficient,
reflecting macro-economic trends.
Ironically though, the reflection of the carbon price volatility on macro-eco-
nomic fundamentals can also endanger the efficiency of the scheme. The global
economic downturn has affected the carbon prices in such a way that it signifi-
7. C. EGENHOFER and N. FUJIWARA, Shaping the Global Arena, Preparing the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme, CEPS Task Force Report, No. 61, March 2007.
8. European Commission, EU action against climate change – The Emissions Trading Scheme, Brussels,
2009.
9. Ibidem.
10. A. KOSSOY and P. AMBROSI, State and Trends of the Carbon Market, Carbon Finance at the World
Bank, Washington DC, May 2010, p. 8.
11. € 22.1 in 2008 and € 14 in 2009.
12. A. KOSSOY and P. AMBROSI, op. cit.THE EU’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: ACHIEVEMENTS, KEY LESSONS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
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cantly modified the EU climate policy projections for the forthcoming years, as
it will be analysed later.
2.2. Impact on corporate behaviour
There is strong evidence that the ETS has had a significant effect on corporate
behaviour. EU businesses in the covered sectors are aware that the ETS is here
to stay. They have accepted that there is a price to pay for emitting carbon and
increasingly take this reality into account in their long-term business strate-
gies.13
2.3. Creation of business opportunities
As a new factor in industries’ decision-making, the scheme has created a lot of
related new business opportunities such as carbon trading, carbon finance, car-
bon management, carbon consulting and carbon auditing.
2.4. Reduction of emissions in a cost-effective manner
The crucial question when assessing the EU ETS is whether it has so far been
able to reduce GHG emissions in a cost-effective manner. The lack of robust and
consistent methodologies and assumptions to evaluate the EU ETS effect on
emissions prevents from giving an accurate answer to this question. Neverthe-
less, according to several important studies14, there has been abatement of some-
where between 2 and 5% during the first period 2005-2007 of the EU ETS
despite an over-allocation of allowances from Member States. This emissions
abatement is central for the political recognition of the scheme.
Besides, the EU ETS should help the EU to comply with its emissions reduction
target under the Kyoto Protocol given that the ETS sectors represent about 40%
of EU total emissions. According to the last progress reports of the European
Environment Agency (EEA), the EU is on track to achieve and even over-achieve
13. N. B. BEKKHUS and K. VAN HECKE, “The European Union Emission Trading Scheme” in The Climate
Change Challenge: International, European and Belgian Aspects, Studia Diplomatica, Vol. LXI, 2008,
N°1, p. 146.
14. A. KOSSOY and P. AMBROSI, op. cit., p. 6; A.D. ELLERMAN and B. BUCHNER, “Over-Allocation or Abate-
ment? A Preliminary Analysis of the EU ETS based on the 2005-06 Emissions Data”, Environmental and
Resource Economics, Vol. 41, n°2, pp. 267-287; A.D. ELLERMAN, F. CONVERY and C. DE PERTHUIS, Pricing
Carbon: The European Union Emissions trading Scheme, Cambridge University Press, 2010.THE EU’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: ACHIEVEMENTS, KEY LESSONS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
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its Kyoto Protocol commitment. When the Kyoto Protocol was agreed upon, the
aggregate objective of the then existing 15 EU Member States was to deliver an
8% reduction of GHG emissions below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012. In
a report of the EEA published in 200915, emissions in the EU-15 were indicated
to be 6.2% below 1990 levels in 2008, i.e. before the consequences of the finan-
cial crisis on the real economy. It was therefore estimated that the further imple-
mentation of additional policies and measures would be necessary in order to
achieve the EU-15 Kyoto target. However, in a report published in October
201016, the EEA indicated that EU-15 emissions in 2009 had decreased by 6.9%
compared to 2008, mainly as a consequence of the economic recession. As a
result of this significant fall in emissions, the EU-15 had already over-achieved
its Kyoto target level in 2009 by a gap equivalent to 2.2% of 1990 levels. More-
over, this overachievement increases to 5.9% when the planned use of CDM and
JI by EU governments and expected carbon sinks removals (i.e. forestry activi-
ties) are taken into account.
It is important to note that being set up as a market mechanism, the EU ETS
should help the EU to achieve its emissions reduction target under the Kyoto
Protocol at a cost accounting for less than 0,1% of EU’s Gross Domestic Prod-
uct.17
The EEA report18 also points out that the significant emissions reductions result-
ing from the economic crisis have a limited impact on the Kyoto target achieve-
ment. Since emission caps in the EU ETS were decided before the recession
occurred, only emissions under the caps count towards the achievement of the
Kyoto targets, not actual verified ETS emissions. Therefore, emissions from
non-ETS sectors “take on a special importance as they are the only ones that
matter for the achievement of Kyoto targets by governments.”19 Accordingly,
abatement efforts in the EU are expected to remain limited during Phase II both
in the non-ETS sectors and in the ETS sectors where allowances have been allo-
cated too generously relative to the emissions reductions resulting from the cri-
sis.
Among the 12 other EU Member States, the 10 which have Kyoto commitments
should also meet or even exceed their targets. According to the EEA, the EU-27
15. European Environment Agency, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trends and Projections in Europe 2009,
EEA Report, No 9/2009, 2009, p. 9.
16. European Environment Agency, Tracking Progress towards Kyoto and 2020 targets in Europe, EEA
Report No 7/2010, 12 October 2010, p. 6.
17. European Commission, EU against climate change – The Emissions Trading Scheme, Brussels, 2009,
p. 5.
18. European Environment Agency (2010), op. cit., p. 7
19. Ibidem, p. 7.THE EU’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: ACHIEVEMENTS, KEY LESSONS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
10
emissions in 2009 decreased by 6.9% as compared to 2008, leaving the EU-27
with already more than 17% of emission reductions below its 1990 levels.20
This makes the achievement of the 20% target by 2020 much easier and cheaper
than initially expected.
20. Ibidem, p. 6.11
3. The shortcomings of the ETS so far
The EU ETS is still a relatively recent policy which has been adopted rapidly.
The lack of reliable and verified data for emission projections and the fear of
industry and Member States regarding the economic costs of the scheme led to
the adoption of a scheme with significant shortcomings. Currently in its fifth
year of existence, the scheme is still far from its theoretical potential. The short-
comings analysed below concern aspects of the scheme which will have a signif-
icant impact on its future, namely the cap-setting, the allocation method, the use
of offset credits, the linking-up with other ETSs and the price volatility and
uncertainty undermining the development and diffusion of new green technolo-
gies. The lessons learnt from these shortcomings will therefore be of particular
interest when assessing the changes brought by the revised directive for phase 3
and the future of the scheme in general.
3.1. Problems posed by decentralised cap-setting
The fact that Member States can determine their cap on allowances for each
trading period is the result of a concession by the Commission to Member States
to get the ETS adopted. Afraid of the impact of this new scheme on their indus-
try’s competitiveness, Member States sought to retain sovereignty on the
amount of GHG emissions liable for reduction (i.e. the cap), constituting the
major determinant of the environmental effectiveness of an ETS.
When Member States established their caps in their national allocation plans
(NAPs) during the first phase, they had no certified data of GHG emissions from
the sectors covered by the ETS. Therefore, they developed “business as usual”
baselines on the basis of their projected growth in emissions. Given the lack of
available data on both historical and projected emissions, and intense lobbying
from national industries, most Member States allowed emissions to rise by over-
estimating their economic growth rates.21
Yet, the price is to a large extent determined by the cap. In 2005, the allowances
prices stayed quite high, but suddenly crashed in April 2006 after the release of
the verified emissions data in 2005. This data showed that emissions allocations
to installations covered for the first period were higher than actual 2005 emis-
sions. Consequently, the lack of demand for allowances provoked a fall in car-
bon prices. Although it was largely argued that this result was due to a signifi-
21. D. ELLERMAN and B. BUCHNER, ”The European Union emissions trading scheme: origins, allocation,
and early results”, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2007.THE EU’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: ACHIEVEMENTS, KEY LESSONS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
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cant over-allocation of allowances from Member States, it is nevertheless
unclear to what extent it is also attributed to actual emission reductions by the
covered sectors.22 In the previous section, it has been seen that emissions reduc-
tions had been achieved during Phase I.
Moreover, the restrictions on banking unused allowances for future use into the
second phase did not offer a possibility to create scarcity on the over-supplied
market. Only Poland and France introduced limited banking in Phase I. These
restrictions can be explained by the fear that too many allowances left to be
carried over to Phase II could have undermined the achievement of the reduction
targets. Nevertheless, the absence of the banking opportunity led to a fall in
carbon prices close to zero during the last months of phase I.
The tight schedule between the first and second periods did not allow for a full
revision of the system in light of Phase I’s shortcomings. As Member States were
again too generous in their allocations, the European Commission took an
active role by rejecting most of the Member States NAPs 2 for inconsistency
with their Kyoto targets. On the basis of an EU-wide methodology of projec-
tions based on 2005 verified emissions and an assessment to ensure that the
allocations were consistent with the Member States Kyoto targets, the Commis-
sion reassessed the caps of each country and thereby opened the path towards
harmonisation. This reassessment reduced aggregate allocations in the EU by
10% compared to the initial NAPs 2.23 Some Member States brought an action
for annulment against the Commission’s decisions and the European Court of
Justice ruled in their favour. However in their new NAPs, Member States finally
agreed on the cap previously determined by the Commission. Besides, the pos-
sibility of banking allowances into Phase III was allowed in Phase II in order to
create scarcity and reduce price volatility.
In its first year, Phase II sustained a substantial carbon price from around € 20
to a peak of just under € 30 in July 2008. However, the price dropped sharply
to € 8 in February 2009 as a consequence of the biggest economic crisis since
the Great Depression of the 1930s. Although Phase II had more or less dealt
with the problem of over-allocation in Phase I, it was without taking into
account this major external factor. The impact of the crisis has exerted down-
ward pressures on energy prices and reduced production. Correspondingly, car-
bon emissions decreased, leading to an unexpected increase in the supply of
allowances. In addition, the supply of offset credits from the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) depressed the carbon price as well. After the worst of the
22. Ibidem; D. ELLERMAN and B. BUCHNER, 2008, op. cit.
23. Carbon trust, EU ETS Phase II allocation: implications and lessons, 21 May 2007, p. 4-6.THE EU’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: ACHIEVEMENTS, KEY LESSONS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
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crisis in the beginning of 2009, the carbon market started to recover. From May
2009 to present, the allowance prices have stabilised within a narrow range of
€ 13 to € 16 and no increase is expected for a while.
3.2. Allocation issues
Once the cap is set, each country has to determine how the amount of allow-
ances will be allocated to the covered installations. The chosen allocation
method influences significantly the distribution of costs and benefits in the
scheme.24 The choice of allocating allowances mainly for free and the inconsist-
encies between the different allocation methods developed by each Member
State have undermined the efficiency and fairness of the scheme.
3.2.1. Administrative burden for authorities and operators
The high degree of discretion for Member States in Phase I induced heavy
administrative burdens, disparities, complexity and a lack of transparency. This
complexity created uncertainty for installations and other market actors, and
thereby increased transaction costs. In order to make Phase II simpler and more
transparent, the Commission established some standardised tables containing
the main information in the NAP.
3.2.2. Inefficiency of new entrant and closure rules
In the course of a trading period, most NAPs offer free allowances to new
entrants, and withdraw allowances from plants upon closure. These rules have
created perverse incentives which discourage investment in low carbon technol-
ogies and keep old and inefficient plants in operation.
Regarding the new entrant rules, each Member States establishes a New Entrant
Reserve which allocates allowances to new installations covered by the ETS. As
new carbon intensive plants receive more free allowances than low carbon
plants, the new entrants have no incentive to invest in clean technologies. Such
a system amounts to implicit subsidies to construct high polluting plants while
the logic of the ETS is to reflect the social cost of carbon emissions and to
encourage investments in low carbon technologies. Furthermore, the new
entrant allocation rules vary largely from one Member State to another. Like-
24. H. VAN HASSELT, The EU ETS in the European climate policy mix: past, present and future, Vrije Uni-
versiteit Amsterdam, 2009, p. 39.THE EU’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: ACHIEVEMENTS, KEY LESSONS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
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wise, there is no harmonisation with regards to the distribution of allowances
and the replenishment of the reserve. According to a study, for the setting-up of
a same combined-cycle power plant in two countries applying different new
entrant allocation rules under Phase II, the value of the plant’s annual allocation
would range from € 0 in Sweden (no free allocation) to € 15 million in Ger-
many.25 Such a difference runs the risk of creating distortions of competition in
the EU market.26 This protection of new investments from the carbon price
remained unchanged in most Member States under Phase II.
As for the closure rules, the withdrawal of allocations from installations upon
closure creates an incentive to keep inefficient installations in operation so they
can retain their allowances. Conversely, an incentive to close inefficient plants is
created when a plant can retain its allowances after closure and invest the reve-
nues in a new replacement plant. This kind of “transfer rule” was already
applied by some Member States in Phase I and the number increased in Phase II.
However, it has also increased the complexity of the system.27
3.2.3. Limits of grandfathering relative to other allocation 
methodologies
Under Phase I and Phase II, allowances were mainly allocated to installations for
free on the basis of their past emissions (i.e. grandfathering). Basically, this
amounts to reward installations that have traditionally polluted more with more
allowances, discouraging abatement efforts. As already illustrated by the issues
related to new entrant and closure rules, free allocation resulted in largely incon-
sistent NAPs, leading to competitive distortions within the EU.
Free allocation has generated huge windfall profits, allowing all the covered
sectors to benefit from the scheme.28 However, undue distributional effects are
not the same among the covered installations. It depends on the ability of sectors
to pass through the costs of their allowances into the product prices while ben-
eficiating from their allowances for free.
25. Assuming 2400 GWh annual electricity generation, an allowance price of € 10 and an electricity price
of € 31/Mwh in M. AHMAN and K. HOLMGREN, “New entrant allocation in the Nordic energy sectors:
incentives and options in the EU ETS”, Swedish Environmental Research Institute, January 2007, p. 12.
26. C. EGENHOFER, N. FUJIWARA, M. AHMAN, L. ZETTERBERG, The EU Emissions Trading Scheme: Taking
Stock and Looking Ahead, CEPS and CLIPORE, July 2006, p. 4.
27. Ibidem.
28. M. GRUBB, T. L. BREWER, M. SATO, R. HEILMAYR, D. FAZEKAS, Climate Policy and Industrial Competi-
tiveness: Ten insights from Europe on the EU Emissions Trading System, The German Marshall Fund of
the United States (GMF), Washington, 2009, p. 4.THE EU’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: ACHIEVEMENTS, KEY LESSONS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
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The sector that has benefited the most from windfall profits so far is the power
sector. The reason being is that on the power market, prices are set by marginal
production costs which include the costs of carbon emissions. If the marginal
producer is a coal power plant, as it is often the case, the increase of the power
price is significant as coal requires many allowances. Low carbon producers
such as hydro or nuclear will then enjoy large profits without incurring the
costs. Besides, all power companies benefit also from their free allowances. This
double rent has generated huge windfall profits. According to a study of Point
Carbon, the windfall profits of power companies in Germany, Italy, Poland,
Spain and the UK could amount to € 23 billion over the second period.29 Most
Member States have recognized the undue distributional effects of free alloca-
tion for Phase II, but they have mainly addressed them by allocating fewer free
allowances within the power sector.
Energy-intensive industries have also gained important windfall profits. In a
study of de Bruyn et al, it has been calculated that the windfall profits obtained
by the refineries and iron and steel sectors between 2005 and 2008 amounted
to € 14 billion.30 Regarding Phase II, a recent study of Sandbag (a campaigning
organisation focused on the issue of emissions trading) estimates that about one
billion of superfluous allowances will have been allocated to the industry sector,
amounting to € 14 billion of windfall profits.31
As a fairer method than grandfathering, benchmarking has been widely consid-
ered but not much used. Under this approach, allowances are still distributed for
free but the allocation is based on a best performance standard, rewarding car-
bon efficiency. The limited use of benchmarking can be explained by the diffi-
culty to agree on appropriate benchmarks given the heterogeneity of production
processes, as well as the lack of data.32 In Phase II, benchmarking was slightly
more used by some Member States but it was limited to the power sector as a
means to reduce windfall profits. The differences of standards between Member
States have led to inconsistencies and risks of distortions in the EU market.33
Here-under, it will be shown that this method has been harmonised under
Phase III.
29. This figure is based on a carbon price of € 21 and some other assumptions in Point Carbon, EU ETS
Phase II – The potential and scale of windfall profits in the power sector, March 2008, p. 2.
30. S. DE BRUYN, A. MARKOWSKA, F. DE JONG and M. BLES, Does the energy intensive industry obtain
windfall profits through the EU ETS? An econometric analysis for products from the refineries, iron and
steel and chemical sectors, CE Delft, April 2010, p. 8.
31. This figure is based on a carbon price of € 14 in D. MORRIS and B. WORTHINGTON, Cap or trap? How
the EU ETS risks locking-in carbon emissions, Sandbag, September 2010, p. 7.
32. H. VAN HASSELT, op. cit., p. 41.
33. C. EGENHOFER, The Making of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: Status, Prospects and Implications
for Business, European Management Journal, Vol. 25, Issue 6, December 2007, p. 458.THE EU’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: ACHIEVEMENTS, KEY LESSONS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
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The best way to avoid windfall profits is auctioning. By selling allowances, the
revenues do no longer go to businesses but to governments’ budgets. Although
there is an economic rationale for optimising the use of auctioning, it has been
allowed up to a limited extent due to the strong opposition of industries: 5% of
allocations for Phase I and 10% for Phase II. Only 4 out of 25 Member States
used this method at all in Phase I, and only Denmark used it up to its 5% limit.
In Phase II, auctioning was used by only 11 countries, especially to address the
windfall profits in the power sector.
3.2.4. Concerns about competitiveness and carbon leakage
Even before the EU ETS came into force, the scheme was heavily criticised by
EU industries. They feared for their competitiveness with foreign industries
which would not have to bear the same carbon constraint. They were also con-
cerned that the increase in production costs due to the carbon constrain, would
encourage European businesses to relocate their activities in third countries
where climate policies are less stringent than in the EU. This phenomenon called
“carbon leakage” would not only undermine the economic activity of the EU, it
would also reduce the environmental benefits of the scheme.
The impact of the EU ETS on competitiveness varies widely according to the
sectors covered under the cap. Contrary to the power sectors, some energy-
intensive industries have features which make them vulnerable to competitive-
ness concerns, and eventually carbon leakage. The literature distinguishes these
concerns according to the direct or indirect effects of the ETS. The direct effects
regard the ability of energy intensive industries to pass through the carbon costs
onto prices paid by consumers as well as their exposure to international com-
petitiveness.34 The indirect effects are due to the increase in power prices in the
EU, resulting from the ETS. As the carbon costs are expected to rise, there is a
fear that power companies raise their prices excessively, in order to pass through
their additional costs, at the expense of big industrial power consumers. These
indirect costs could have impacts for both industries covered and industries not
covered by the ETS.35
So far, the carbon prices have been too low to impact on the competitiveness of
EU energy-intensive industries. Many studies have argued that the risk of carbon
leakage has been largely over-estimated and, though the impacts are difficult to
34. Reviewing the EU emissions trading scheme – priorities for short-term implementation of the second
round of allocation, CEPS Task Force Report, No. 56, 2005; J. REINAUD, Industrial competitiveness under
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, IEA Information Paper, 2005.
35. C. EGENHOFER and N. FUJIWARA, 2005, op. cit.THE EU’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: ACHIEVEMENTS, KEY LESSONS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
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estimate, it is actually limited to a small number of energy intensive sectors.36
This is not surprising since the cost for carbon induced by the ETS is very small
compared to other costs that determine industrial production and location such
as volatile exchange rates and energy costs.
The fear regarding competitiveness has nevertheless allowed energy intensive
industries to secure generous allocations of allowances during the two first
phases. These large amounts of freely obtained allowances led to the windfall
profits described earlier.
3.3. Controversial issues on the use of offset credits
Besides cap setting and allocation methods, the use of credits generated from
CDM and JI also suffers from a lack of harmonisation. Between and within
Member States the use of offset credits is very controversial and has raised both
quantitative arguments, i.e. on the amount of credits that should be allowed,
and qualitative arguments, i.e. on the type of projects that should be accepted.
Regarding the quantity of credits, the development of the use of CDM and JI
credits in the EU ETS has advantages and drawbacks. The main reason of the
use of offset credits is that they provide cheaper options to reduce emissions and
thereby act as a safety valve against price spikes. Besides, they contribute to
sustainable development in developing countries. However, the use of CDM and
JI credits reduces the incentives for domestic abatement and technological inno-
vation within the EU. Moreover, a significant supply of offset credits combined
with a low demand exerts a downward pressure on the price signal.
During pilot Phase I, the use of credits generated from CDM and JI was very
limited. Given the over-allocation of allowances and the impossibility of bank-
ing credits, there was no incentive for EU operators to use such mechanisms.
Moreover, the capacities to implement them were not yet fully adequate.
With respect to Phase II, the Commission decided that the use of CDM/JI credits
by installations under the EU ETS might not be lower than 10% of the allow-
ances allocated to each installation. This limit must be consistent with Member
States’ commitment to supplementarity under the Kyoto Protocol which
36. European Commission, McKinsey and Ecofys, EU ETS Review – Report on international competi-
tiveness, Brussels, December 2006; U. OBERNDORFER and K. RENNINGS, “Costs and Competitiveness of
the European Emissions Trading Scheme”, Centre for European Economic Research, Eur. Env., Vol. 17,
No. 1, 2007; J.C. HOURCADE, D. DEMAILLY, K. NEUHOFF, M. SATO, Differentiation and dynamics of EU
ETS industrial competitiveness impacts, Climate Strategies, 2007.THE EU’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: ACHIEVEMENTS, KEY LESSONS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
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requires that the use of CDM and JI credits is supplemental to domestic abate-
ment efforts in each developed country. In the absence of a definition of this
‘supplementarity principle’ in European and public international law, the Com-
mission interpreted this requirement as a ceiling of 50% with regard to the
aggregate use of CDM/JI credits within the EU.37
The Commission justified its decision by arguing that it reflects a “reasonable
balance” between domestic reductions and incentives for operators to invest in
projects in developing countries. This statement is however problematic in light
of the figures. Given that the overall cap in Phase II is only 6% lower than
comparable 2005 emissions, while the offset budget within the EU ETS amounts
to approximately 13% of the overall cap, it is clear that the limit on the use of
CDM/JI is far too generous.38 Consequently, the whole offset budget not only
substitutes from the overall reduction effort but, it also allows the EU to increase
its emissions by a quantity equivalent to the overall reduction effort required by
the scheme.
On the basis of the Commission’s decisions with regard to NAPs for Phase II,
credits from CDM and JI have been allowed to enter the scheme up to the gen-
erous limit of 1.4 billion offset credits during 2008-2012.39 With the impact of
the global economic recession, only 132 million tons of CDM credits were
issued in 2009, 10% less than in 2008.40 Globally only 400 million tons of
CDM credits had been issued in May 2010.41
According to a study of Sandbag42, approximately 81 million of offset credits
were used for compliance in 2008 and 2009. This study estimates that some 611
million offset credits will be used during Phase II. It is thus already clear that
offset credits will have been used much less than the limit allowed for Phase II.
This should allow an amount of about 789 unused offset credits43 to be carried
over from Phase II to Phase III. The consequences of this transfer will be ana-
lysed in the section 5.3.
Still according to Sandbag estimates, the EU ETS should achieve a tiny reduction
37. Communication from the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament on the assess-
ment of national allocation plans for the allocation of greenhouse gas emission allowances in the second
period of the EU Emissions trading Scheme, COM (2006) 725, Brussels, 29 November 2006.
38. J. DE SEPIBUS, “Linking the EU Emissions Trading Scheme to JI, CDM and post-2012 International
Offsets”, nccr trade regulation, October 2008, p. 10.
39. A. KOSSOY and P. AMBROSI, op. cit., p. 18.
40. Ibidem, p. 15.
41. Ibidem.
42. D. MORRIS and B. WORTHINGTON, op. cit., p. 19.
43. The difference between the 1.4 billion offset credits available for use in Phase II and the 611 million
offset credits which will have been used in Phase II.THE EU’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: ACHIEVEMENTS, KEY LESSONS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
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of 32 million tonnes of carbon emissions during Phase II.44 However, the addi-
tion of the use of offset credits (611 MtCO2) will bring the EU to increase its
domestic emissions by some 579 million tonnes.
The quality of the project mechanisms also proved very controversial, especially
in the case of CDM. First of all, the development of the CDM has shown a real
tension between its two-fold objectives: contributing to sustainable develop-
ment in developing countries and reducing emissions in a cost-effective way in
developed countries. Indeed, the most cost-effective and successful projects are
also those which contribute the least to sustainable development (the most crit-
icised are the HFC and N2O projects), whereas the projects linked to significant
sectors of sustainable development are almost unsupported by the CDM. To
date, the EU has not imposed qualitative restrictions, except for forestry, nuclear
and large hydroelectric projects. Moreover, some regions are overrepresented.
China, India and Brazil account for 75% of carbon revenues whereas low-
income countries in greater need of the revenues CDM can receive only 3%.45
Finally, the environmental integrity of the CDM itself is disputed.46 In order to
reduce emissions, CDM projects must carry emission reductions additional to
what would have occurred otherwise. However, this claim of additionality is
difficult to prove and the risk of validating ‘business as usual’ projects is actual.
More generally, the fact that the rules governing the use of offset credits from
2013 are still unclear – depending on the result of the global climate negotia-
tions – creates a lot of uncertainties around the future developments of CDM
and JI.
3.4. Issues relevant to linking up with other ETSs
When looking back in history, the adoption of a cap and trade system was pro-
moted by the United-States to the EU in order to reduce their GHG emissions.
The EU accepted this instrument in return for a tougher emissions reduction
commitment from the US and with the idea of linking both their systems in the
future. However, the US has finally never ratified the Kyoto Protocol, nor
adopted the ETS it advocated. The EU became then the supporter of a system
that it would not have originally defended.
44. Ibidem.
45. World Bank, “Generating the Funding Needed for Mitigation and Adaptation”, in World Develop-
ment Report 2010: Development and Climate Change, 9 November 2009, p. 265.
46. Commission Staff Working Document, accompanying document to the Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the
EU greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system, Impact assessment, SEC(2008) 52, Brussels, 23
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One of the main ambitions of the EU ETS remains to be linked with other cap
and trade schemes in third countries. When the EU ETS Directive was adopted
in 2003, it provided therefore the possibility of linking the EU ETS with other
developed countries having ratified the Kyoto Protocol through agreements on
the mutual recognition of allowances. To date, apart from the incorporation of
the ETS Directive into the European Economic Area in 200847, there has been
no linking up of the EU ETS with other cap and trade schemes. This absence of
linkages between schemes will be further analysed below.
The ambition of the EU ETS to move towards a world-wide carbon market is
driven by several reasons. Not only would it ensure that environmental objec-
tives are met globally, but it would also allow a wider geographical scope to
identify least cost abatement options. The emergence of a global carbon price
would also avoid risks of carbon leakage, while ensuring a certain degree of
fairness in terms of sharing the burden between all emitters.48
However, linking also raises a number of concerns due to the heterogeneity of
domestic and regional schemes regarding their targets and design features prior
to linking. Poorly-designed linking of ETSs can undermine the environmental
effectiveness of the overall system. Some significant issues include the differences
of caps leading to an uneven distribution of gains across countries/regions; the
existence of a price control mechanism in one system increasing the emissions
throughout the linked system; and the different criteria used for the eligibility of
credits from offsetting projects leading to different environmental guarantees. It
is therefore central to reach an agreement on the harmonisation of essential key
features before linking. Besides an agreement on the mutual recognition of
allowances, the Directive does not contain any other criteria before linking the
EU ETS with other schemes. The decision on whether or not linking the EU ETS
with another scheme has to be made on a case-by-case basis. It is nevertheless
foreseen that the Commission shall draw up any necessary provisions relating to
the schemes linkage under the agreement relating to the recognition of allow-
ances.
3.5. Price volatility and uncertainty
The fact that the market functions does not mean that it has provided a stable
and effective carbon price. On the contrary, carbon prices have remained far too
low and volatile to stimulate any substantial investments in the research, devel-
47. This incorporation has led to the extension of the scheme to Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.
48. Commission Staff Working Document, op. cit., p. 131.THE EU’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: ACHIEVEMENTS, KEY LESSONS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
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opment and deployment of new and low-carbon technologies within the EU.
Yet, this is an essential element of the fight against climate change in the long-
run.
The reasons of the failure to provide sufficient incentives to invest in new and
low-carbon technologies can be found in the lack of certainty within and outside
the EU ETS’ regulatory framework.
Within the scheme’s regulatory framework, price volatility and uncertainty stem
from many elements. In Phase I, the data limitations, the lack of ambition of
Member States’ caps and the inability to carry over unused allowances into
Phase II created significant price fluctuations. Although these issues were more
or less addressed in Phase II, the uncertainty stemming from the short allocation
periods relative to investment cycles and the perverse effects from free alloca-
tion, including the new entrant and closure rules, remained.
Many other macro-economic fundamentals affect price volatility outside the EU
ETS’ regulatory framework. Although this is inherent to a market mechanism,
it creates further uncertainty. In the case of the ETS, it stems especially from the
indecision of international climate negotiations, energy prices, weather condi-
tions, technological progresses and last but not least unexpected changes in eco-
nomic growth. In Phase II, the carbon prices remained relatively high and stable
until the 2008-2009 economic recession. But by reducing the industrial produc-
tion, the crisis brought about a fall in emissions and an over-supply of allow-
ances, leading to decreased carbon price, which have led companies to cancel or
delay their investments in emission reduction projects.
While the factors affecting the price signal within the EU ETS’ regulatory frame-
work can be addressed, the macro-economic factors are much more unpredict-
able. It must be remembered that, as a cap and trade scheme, the EU ETS can
guarantee the reduction of a quantity of emissions but not a fixed price. The
price of carbon is seen as a function of supply and demand over the short and
long terms. This is the reason why the European Commission rejected the pos-
sibility of ex post adjustments49, allowing the reduction of the supply of allow-
ances in case of rapidly falling demand. Such ex post adjustments would have
disruptive effects on the allowances market, increasing uncertainty rather than
reducing it.
49. Communication from the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament on the assess-
ment of the national allocation plans for allocation of greenhouse gas emission allowances in the second
period of the EU Emissions trading Scheme, COM(2006) 725 final, 29 November 2006, p. 8.THE EU’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: ACHIEVEMENTS, KEY LESSONS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
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Therefore, the key long-term challenge of the ETS is to set up a scheme that
responds to new economic and environmental impacts, but in a credible and
predictable way in order to maintain R&D and technology adoption incen-
tives.50
50. OECD, The Economics of Climate Change Mitigation – Policies and Options for Global Action
Beyond 2012, 2009, p.67.23
4. Description of the revised ETS post-2012
On the basis of the lessons learned from the first phases, the Commission
released a proposal for a revised ETS Directive in January 2008. This proposal
was part of a wider package composed of several legislative proposals aiming to
achieve the EU’s 2020 targets of a 20% reduction of GHG emissions, a 20%
improvement in energy efficiency and a 20% share in the production of renew-
able energy. This climate and energy package was finally adopted in December
2008, giving birth to the revised ETS Directive 2009/29.51 In the following sec-
tions, the main elements of this revised Directive are analysed.
4.1. Wider scope of application
From 2013, the scope of the EU ETS will be extended to cover new sectors. This
includes: GHG emissions from petrochemicals, ammonia and aluminium sec-
tors, as well as N2O emissions from the production of nitric, adipic and glyox-
ylic acid, and perfluocarbon emissions from the aluminium sector. Installations
undertaking the capture, transport and geological storage of greenhouse gases
will also be included. The addition of these sectors is expected to extend the
coverage of the scheme from around 40% to 43% of total EU greenhouse gas
emissions.
At the same time, Member States will be able to remove small installations from
the scheme on the condition that alternative measures are in place that will
achieve an equivalent reduction in their emissions. This opportunity is justified
by the recognition that small installations, emitting relatively low amounts of
emissions, have to bear participation costs superior to the environmental bene-
fits of the scheme.
From 2012, GHG emissions from civil aviation will also be included in the EU
ETS.52 Emissions from shipping should be included at a later stage. According
to the revised Directive53, in case no international agreement is approved on
maritime emissions, or such an agreement is unsatisfactory to the EU by 31
December 2011, the Commission should make a proposal to include interna-
tional maritime emissions with the aim of adopting such legislation by 2013.
Other sectors like road transport and forestry were also considered but called
for further investigation due to their many uncertainties.
51. OJ 2009, L 140, 63-87.
52. Article 3c of Directive 2008/101/EC.
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4.2. EU-wide cap
One of the main changes of the revised directive is the replacement of the current
decentralised system of 27 national caps on emissions by an EU wide cap pro-
posed by the Commission and agreed by the European Council.
In order to establish this harmonised cap-setting, it is initially required to estab-
lish an overall reduction objective for the EU ETS. This EU ETS objective is part
of the EU commitment endorsed by the European Council in 2007 to reduce
20% of total GHG emissions by 2020 compared to 1990 levels, which is equiv-
alent to a 14% reduction compared to 2005. This 20% reduction effort has
been divided between the ETS sectors and all other sectors not covered by the
ETS. As it is considered more cost-effective to reduce emission in the ETS sec-
tors, the latter will have to reduce 21% of their GHG emissions by 2020 com-
pared to 2005 whereas the non-ETS sectors will have to achieve a 10% reduc-
tion by 2020 compared to 2005. Moreover, these objectives could change if, as
pledged, the EU decides to increase its 20% overall target to 30% in case of
comparable commitments by other developed countries. In the long-term, it has
already been agreed that the EU will have to reduce 80 to 95% of its GHG
emissions by 2050 compared to 1990 levels.
To achieve this ETS target, the quantity of allowances or the cap will be reduced
by 1.74% annually starting in 2013 until 2020 and beyond. This will lead to a
21% reduction of the number of allowances available in 2005 by 2020. The
initial quantity of allowances, on which this linear reduction will be based, will
correspond to the average total quantity of allowances issued by Member States
in accordance with the Commission Decisions on their national allocation plans
for the 2008 to 2012 period. This quantity of allowances will be adjusted how-
ever to take into account the broadened scope of the scheme. The revised Direc-
tive indicates that the Commission will publish adjusted quantities by 30 Sep-
tember 2010.54 In July 2010 though, the cap for 2013 has been fixed by the
Commission at 1.926.876.368 allowances.55
54. Article 9a, § 2 and 3 of the revised Directive 2003/87/EC.
55. Commission Decision of 9 July 2010 on the Community-wide quantity of allowances to be issued
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4.3. Auctioning becomes the rule and free allocation 
a slowly dying exception
Auctioning will progressively become the main allocation method, instead of the
current method whereby allowances are principally allocated for free. More
than simply reflecting the ‘polluter pays’ principle, auctioning avoids giving
windfall profits to certain sectors, reduces price volatility, maximises the price-
signal, triggers investments in the development and research of low carbon tech-
nologies and provides significant revenues.
Since experience has showed the ability of the power sector to pass on the car-
bon costs to their consumers, it will in principle have to purchase all its allow-
ances from 2013 onwards. However, under certain conditions some Member
States will have the option to temporarily deviate from this rule with respect to
existing power plants.56 The auctioning rate of these plants will be at least 30%
relative to emissions in the first period and will have to increase progressively to
100% in 2020. Full auctioning will also apply to installations involved in the
capture, transport and storage of carbon from 2013 but allowances for the emis-
sions stored will not have to be surrendered.
For other manufacturing sectors covered by the ETS, there will be a progressive
phase-out of free allocation on an annual basis, starting with an 80% share of
free allowances in 2013, and decreasing to 30% in 2020 with a view to reaching
full auctioning in 2027. However, some energy intensive industries deemed to be
exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage will be able to receive free allow-
ances in the long-term. This exception will be analysed in the following section
4.4.
The amount of free allowances allocated to the installations will be determined
by EU-wide ex ante benchmarks so as “to ensure that allocation takes place in
a manner that provides incentives for reductions in GHG emissions and energy
efficient techniques”.57 In line with the revised Directive, the Commission, in
October 2010, released its draft Decision on free allocation rules58 which was
adopted by the Climate Change Committee on 15 December and has been sub-
mitted to the European Parliament and the Council for a three-month scrutiny
before formal adoption by the Commission. The starting point for the bench-
56. Article 10c of the revised Directive 2003/87/EC.
57. Article 10a 1 of the revised Directive 2003/87/EC.
58. European Commission, Draft Commission Decision determining transitional Union-wide rules for
the harmonised free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 2003/87/EC,
Brussels, 25 October 2010, available on http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/docs/decision_free_
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marks is the average of the 10% most carbon-efficient installations in sectors or
sub-sectors, calculated for each product falling under the definition of a product
benchmark.59 The amount of allowances for an installation will be calculated
by multiplying a benchmark value with the historical production data for the
period 2005-2008, i.e. just before the crisis. According to the draft Decision of
the Commission, if an installation also produces products not covered by a pro-
duct benchmark, additional allowances will be provided on the basis of three
fallback approaches: fuel benchmark, heat benchmark, and process emissions.
The amount of free allowances to be allocated per installation will be calculated
by the Member States competent authorities on the basis of the harmonised
rules and under the scrutiny of the Commission.
88% of the total quantity of allowances to be auctioned will be distributed
among Member States on the basis of their relative share of verified emissions
from the EU ETS in 2005 or the average of the period 2005-2007, depending on
the highest one. In order to help the poorest Member States to invest in reducing
their emissions and adapt to the effects of climate change, 10% will be distrib-
uted to them on the basis of solidarity. The remaining 2% of the total quantity
of allowances will be distributed as a ‘Kyoto bonus’ to the most virtuous Mem-
ber States which in 2005 had cut their GHG emissions by at least 20% below
their emission levels in their base year under the Kyoto Protocol. These countries
are mainly Eastern and Central Europe countries which have benefited from
‘easy reductions’ thanks to their situation before 1990.60
National governments will hold auctions of allowances and any person in the
EU will be able to buy them according to the rules of the internal market. In July
2010, Member States unanimously voted in support of a Commission’s draft
Regulation on the timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning61 “to
ensure that it is conducted in an open, transparent, harmonised and non-dis-
criminatory manner”.62 The draft Regulation was submitted to the European
Parliament and the Council for a three-month scrutiny and was adopted by the
Commission in November 2010.
59. Article 10a 2 of the revised Directive 2003/87/EC. For comprehensive studies on the issue, see: C.
EGENHOFER and A. GEORGIEV, Benchmarking in the EU: Lessons from the EU Emissions Trading System
for the Global Climate Change Agenda, CEPS, 11 June 2010; Ecofys, Fraunhofer Institute for Systems
and Innovation Research and Öko-Institut, Methodology for the free allocation of emission allowances in
the EU ETS post 2012, November 2009.
60. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland Romania, Slovakia.
61. European Commission, Draft Commission Regulation on the timing, administration and other
aspects of auctioning of greenhouse gas emission allowances pursuant to Directive2003/87/EC of the
European Parliament and the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowances trad-
ing within the Community, 2010, available on: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/
draft_auct_reg_14072010.pdf
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Auction revenue will accrue to national Governments. It is estimated that auc-
tioning could raise about € 50 billion of revenues annually by 2020. On the
basis of a Member States’ non-binding agreement, the revised Directive recom-
mends that at least 50% of auction revenue should be used to combat and adapt
to climate change, in both the EU and developing countries.
Regarding the new entrant rules, 5% of the total quantity of allowances will be
assigned to a New Entrant Reserve dedicated to the allocation of allowances to
new entrants according to the method used for installations already covered by
the scheme. For instance, new entrants in the power sector will have to buy their
allowances. As for closures, no free allocation will be given to an installation
that shuts down, unless the operator demonstrates that its installation will
resume production within a specified and reasonable time.63 Such a rule harmo-
nises the old “transfer rule”. However, the move towards full auctioning will
make it die out anyway.
4.4. Preventing carbon leakage
An important exception to the auctioning of emission allowances has been made
for some energy-intensive sectors that are exposed to a significant risk of carbon
leakage due to laxer emission constraints in other regions of the world. These
sectors will continue to receive 100% of their allowances for free in the long
term and will be regularly subjected to a situational assessment. However, their
share of free allowances will decrease with the annually declining cap.
In its decision 2010/2/EU, the Commission identified the energy-intensive sec-
tors and sub-sectors that are expected to be subject to carbon leakage.64 To do
so, it followed a methodology in three phases.65
In Phase I, a quantitative analysis is performed through the assessment of two
main criteria. The first criterion calculates the carbon intensity, i.e. the extent to
which the ETS increases the costs of a covered sector due to the direct and indi-
63. Article 10a 19 of the revised Directive 2003/87/EC.
64. Commission Decision of 24 December 2009 determining pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council, a list of sectors and subsectors which are deemed to be exposed
to a significant risk of carbon leakage, 2010/2/EU, OJ 2010, L 1/10-18. It gives a list of sectors and sub-
sectors which are deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage adopted under the comitol-
ogy procedure by the Commission, available on http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri-
Serv.do?uri=CELEX:32010D0002:EN:NOT
65. Article 10a § 14-18; European Commission, Commission services paper on Energy Intensive Indus-
tries exposed to significant risk of carbon leakage, October 2008, p. 6-7, available on: http://www.eurac-
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rect effects. The second criterion assesses the trade exposure as a (sub-)sector
which is exposed to international competition can hardly pass through carbon
costs by increasing its market price without losing market share. Therefore, it
has been considered that an ETS sector is at risk of carbon leakage either when
its carbon intensity or its trade exposure exceeds a threshold of 30%, or when
its carbon intensity exceeds 5% and its trade exposure exceeds 10%.
In Phase II, a qualitative analysis takes into account other market factors such
as the potential for emissions abatement through innovation, market concentra-
tion and profit margins. This analysis could lead to an addition of sectors and
sub-sectors relative to Phase I.
Finally, Phase III re-assesses the results of the two first phases in light of mitiga-
tion efforts in other countries. The imbalance in carbon constraints between the
EU and third countries is indeed the source of carbon leakage. For instance, the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimated
that if the EU acts alone by reducing its emissions by 50% in 2050, 11.5% of
this abatement effort would be offset by emission increases in third countries.
Inversely, if all developed countries take similar commitments, carbon leakage
would be reduced to less than 2%.66 According to the revised Directive, the
Commission was supposed to assess the risk of carbon leakage in the light of the
outcome of the international negotiations in a report by June 2010. However, in
a Communication of May 2010, the Commission rightly states that a definitive
assessment is difficult considering the fact that the UNFCCC negotiations are
continuing.67 Therefore, the rules on carbon leakage remain uncertain as
dependent on the international context.
Carbon costs passed on in electricity prices could also expose some electro-
intensive sectors to the risk of carbon leakage. In order to avoid such risk, the
revised Directive provides for the possibility of national state aids to compensate
these so-called indirect emitters. Consequently, the Commission has undertaken
to adapt the Environmental State Aid Guidelines by 31 December 2010.
66. OECD,  The Economics of Climate Change Mitigation: Policies and Options for Global Action
Beyond 2012, September 2009, p. 84.
67. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Analysis of options to move beyond
20% greenhouse gas emission reductions and assessing the risk of carbon leakage, COM (2010) 265
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4.5. Use of offset credits
The Directive extends the possibility for operators to use offset credits generated
by emission-saving projects in the third period. However, the quantitative and
qualitative restrictions on the access to these credits will depend on the conclu-
sion of a satisfactory international climate agreement.
With regard to quantitative restrictions, in the current scenario of a 20% emis-
sions reduction target with no international climate agreement, the revised
Directive allows a limited additional quantity of credits to be used during Phase
III in addition to the generous quantity allowed in Phase II. However, this use is
limited to 50% of the EU-wide emission reductions below the 2005 levels over
the period 2008-2020. In addition to the limit of 1400 MtCO2 during Phase II,
about 300 MtCO2 of additional credits will be made available in Phase III (150
MtCO2 for existing installations and 150 MtCO2 for new sectors and installa-
tions).68 Accordingly, the total limit for offset credits during 2008-2020 should
amount to 1700 MtCO2.
At the installations level, all of them will be able to use credits up to either the
amount allowed to them during Phase II, or a minimum amount of 11% of their
allocation during the period 2008-2012.69 All installations with a higher limit
than 11% under Phase II will thus keep it under Phase III (e.g. Germany, Spain,
Italy), while all installations with a lower limit will benefit from a limited
increase of up to 11% (e.g. UK, Poland, Belgium). Furthermore, a credit limit
beyond 11% will be given to the installations with the lowest sum of free allo-
cation and allowed use of credits in Phase II. For the new sectors and new
entrants, the minimum access to credits will be 4.5% of their verified emissions
during Phase III. For the aviation sector, the access will be limited to at least
1.5%.
In the case of a move towards a 30% emissions reduction target by 2020, the
Commission may propose to allow additional access to credits. In line with the
initial proposal from the Commission, an indicative offset budget of 2570
MtCO2 can be given.70
With respect to qualitative restrictions, in the situation where no international
agreement is reached, offset credits will not be used directly for compliance but
will need to be exchanged against Phase III allowances. The revised Directive
68. A. KOSSOY and P. AMBROSI, op. cit., p. 18.
69. Article 11a § 8 of the revised Directive 2003/87/EC.
70. Point Carbon, “The EU ETS review: Implications for credit import”, CEPS, 14 January 2009.THE EU’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: ACHIEVEMENTS, KEY LESSONS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
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makes a difference between three kinds of credits. Firstly, credits issued during
Phase II will have to be exchanged with allowances by 31 March 2015. Sec-
ondly, credits issued after 2012, but generated from projects registered during
Phase II, will be exchangeable until the end of Phase III in 2020. Thirdly, credits
from projects registered during Phase III will only be exchanged throughout
Phase III if they come from projects in least developed countries or projects
established on the basis of a bilateral agreement with third countries from 2013
onwards. The use of this additional quantity of credits relative to the credits
from projects registered during Phase II should not increase the overall credit
import limit beyond 50% of the required reductions. Besides, the revised Direc-
tive foresees that “measures may be applied to restrict the use of specific credits
from project types”71 from 2013 onwards.
In the event of a stricter emissions reduction in the context of a global agree-
ment, only credits from third countries which have ratified the new agreement
will be eligible for use in the EU scheme. These credits will not have to be
exchanged but will be used straight for compliance, while respecting the overall
credit import limit.
4.6. Criteria for linking up with other ETSs
The revised Directive offers the possibility to conclude agreements for the rec-
ognition of allowances between the EU ETS and any other compatible ETSs in
the world, provided that these schemes are mandatory and that they have abso-
lute emissions caps. Moreover, it also provides the possibility to conclude non-
binding arrangements between the EU ETS and any other countries or sub-fed-
eral or regional entities to provide for administrative and technical coordina-
tion.72
4.7. Price volatility control
The extension of the banking system, the longer trading period of eight years,
along with the predictable linear reduction of the cap and the increasing use of
auctioning by 2020 should improve price stability in the third trading period.
In order to further address price volatility the revised Directive introduced two
other mechanisms. The first mechanism requires the Commission to present
71. Article 11a § 9 of the revised Directive 2003/87/EC.
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proposals, where appropriate, to ensure the protection of the market for emis-
sions allowances in case it is not sufficiently protected from insider dealing or
market manipulation.73 The second mechanism only applies in case of excessive
price fluctuations in the market. If, for more than six months, the allowance
price is more than three times the average price during the two preceding years
and the price evolution is not based on market fundamentals, one of two meas-
ures may be adopted. The first measure would allow Member States to bring
forward the auctioning of a part of their allowances to be auctioned. The second
measure would allow Member States to auction up to 25% of the remaining
allowances in the new entrant reserve.74
73. Article 12a of the revised Directive 2003/87/EC.
74. Article 29a of the revised Directive 2003/87/EC.33
5. Assessment of the revised ETS post-2012 
in light of shortcomings of previous 
periods
The many problems experienced during the first years of the EU ETS have
brought important lessons. The changes introduced in the revised EU ETS Direc-
tive show that most of these lessons have been learned. However, since the
review in 2008, the global economic recession has significantly changed the
assumptions made by then, undermining the future climate policy. To save the
integrity of the scheme, the policy-makers should therefore review the EU ETS
in light of the new economic and political context.
5.1. An EU-wide cap predictable but no longer 
stringent
The abolition of the decentralised system allowing Member States to determine
the total quantity of allowances and the method to allocate these allowances is
one of the main achievements of the revised ETS. It will simplify the EU ETS by
establishing a clear distinction between the cap setting and the allocation proc-
ess which was pretty blurred under the NAPs. It will also abolish the incentive
for each Member State to favour its own industry, creating inequalities between
industries of different countries. Moreover, it will put an end to discussions
between Member States and the Commission on the establishment of NAPs that
had led to legal actions by some countries in Phase II.
The EU-wide cap approach holds two main positive aspects. On the one hand,
the cap is entirely set at the EU level. However, Member States are still support-
ive of the ambition level as they agreed on the reduction targets. On the other
hand, the linear reduction of the cap is expected not only to create further cer-
tainty and predictability for industries, but also to improve the carbon price by
creating an increasing scarcity of allowances in the market.
In a Decision in July 2010, the Commission determined the cap for 2013 at just
under 1.927 billion allowances.75 This cap has been set with a view to reach the
EU ETS sectors’ target to reduce 21% of their emissions by 2020 compared to
2005. However, the consequences of the economic recession have made the EU
ETS target inappropriate and ineffective. The decrease in industrial output has
led to a fall in demand and an over-supply of allowances. Consequently, an
75. Commission Decision, C(2010) 4658 final, op. cit.THE EU’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: ACHIEVEMENTS, KEY LESSONS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
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amount of approximately 1.368 billion of unused allowances and credits during
Phase II could be carried over into Phase III.76 In addition, it has been seen that
around 300 million offset credits will be made available in Phase III. Conse-
quently, approximately 1668 million of allowances and credits are expected to
inflate the total Phase III cap. Such a volume of carbon should allow emissions
to grow with no need for domestic abatement until at least 2016.77
As foreseen in the revised directive, the Commission decision on the cap for
2013 is based on Member States’ allocations in Phase II but also takes into
account the increased scope of the scheme and the new entrants from 2008 to
31 August 2010. However, since the economic crisis has created an over-alloca-
tion of allowances in Phase II, the establishment of Phase III EU-wide cap on the
basis of allocations in Phase II is likely to be undermined by a baseline which is
no longer effective.
In order to preserve the integrity of the scheme, the EU should address the insta-
bility brought by the economic recession by tightening the cap. This would
deliver a higher carbon price and thereby encourage green investments. The
most efficient solution to do so would be the EU to move unilaterally towards a
30% reduction of its GHG emissions by 2020 from 1990 levels, without waiting
for an international agreement. In May 2010, the Commission released a Com-
munication in which it analysed the options for a possible shift to a 30% tar-
get.78 In the case such a move occurs, the cap would need to be revised. The
Commission proposes to increase the ETS objective to 34% below 2005 levels
by reducing allowances planned for auction by 15% by 2020. This would set
aside some 1.4 billion allowances in Phase III which represents what is needed
to compensate the 1.368 billion of unused allowances and credits in Phase II
carried over into Phase III. As the efforts required for the 20% target set in 2008
amount more or less to what is required today to reach the 30% target, the move
towards 30% emissions reductions by 2020 can be considered as a compensa-
tory measure of the consequences of the crisis.
76. This amount consists of some 387 million of unused allowances in Phase II, some 192 million unused
allowances from the New Entrants Reserve (NER) and some 789 million unused offset credits. The two
first figures are taken from the study of D. MORRIS and B. WORTHINGTON from Sandbag, op. cit. p. 19,
and the last figure is explained p. 14 of this paper; In the Communication from the Commission, COM
(2010) 265 final, op. cit., the amount of allowances carried over from Phase II into Phase III is estimated
to 5%-8% of the total Phase II cap, or some 500-800 million of unused allowances. This equates more or
less to the sub-mentioned 387 million of unused allowances plus the 192 million unused allowances from
the NER, i.e. a total of 579 million unused allowances.
77. This assumption is derived from Sandbag, Rescuing the EU ETS from redundancy, 2010, p. 4.
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5.2. Allocation methods not perfectly tailored
While analysing the allocation issues of the first phases, it has been shown that the
impact of the carbon constraint from the scheme differs from one sector to
another. This depends mainly on each sector’s ability to pass on direct and indirect
carbon costs onto prices, its exposure to international competitiveness and its
potential for emissions abatement through new technologies, market concentra-
tion and profit margins. In order to alleviate distributional effects and competitive-
ness concerns, it is thus important to tailor the allocation methods according to
each sector’s features. That is what the revised EU ETS tried to establish for its
third trading period with full auctioning for the power sector, a progressive phase-
out of free allocation based on ex ante benchmarks for other sectors and a 100%
free allocation for some energy-intensive sectors deemed to be exposed to a risk of
carbon leakage. However, we will see that the criteria used to determine the impact
of the scheme on the sectors’ competitiveness are not perfectly tailored. Many sec-
tors eligible for receiving free allowances are actually not at risk of closure or car-
bon leakage as a result of the expected more stringent carbon pricing under Phase
III. Therefore, despite the choice of benchmarking as a tailored allocation method,
some energy-intensive industries will still be able to benefit from windfall profits.
The move towards an increasing use of auctioning over time was supported by
the need to address many of the issues linked to free allocation, such as windfall
profits and distortions of competition due to over-allocation. Therefore, wind-
fall profits for the power sector will disappear in the third period. In 2013,
around 50% of the total volume of allowances is expected to be auctioned while
the rest of allowances will be allocated for free.
The quantity of free allowances allocated to the installations will be determined
by ex ante benchmarks, providing a tailored solution for each sector or sub-
sector. The excellent technical work made by the Commission for establishing
these benchmarks has to be recognised and promoted outside the EU. Given that
the benchmarks are quite stringent, only around 10% of the installations, the
most efficient ones, will have any chance of receiving all their allowances for
free. The others will have to buy all allowances above the benchmarks. Thereby,
operators that have taken early action to reduce greenhouse gases will be
rewarded. As allocations will no longer depend on historical emissions, this allo-
cation methodology will give stronger incentives to reduce emissions for both
new entrants and existing installations. It also better reflects the polluter pays
principle, and thereby has the potential to ensure a non-distorted carbon price
and considerably reduce windfall profits.79
79. C. EGENHOFER and A. GEORGIEV, Benchmarking in the EU: Lessons from the EU Emissions Trading
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However, contrary to the benchmarks, the methodology designed to identify the
industries that will receive free emission allowances in the third phase is more
the result of a political arrangement than an economically-based approach.
Many recent studies have shown that the criteria chosen to identify these indus-
tries are not restrictive enough.80 Under these criteria, the Commission identi-
fied 164 out of all 258 manufacturing sectors as being at risk of carbon leak-
age.81 Yet, according to Climate Strategies, out of these 164 sectors, only 13
would be likely to relocate outside the EU, including steel, cement, aluminium,
paper and pulp, some chemical sub-sectors and refineries.82 As described above,
the quantitative analysis is established according to two criteria (i.e. trade expo-
sure and carbon intensity) based on thresholds defining three groups of sectors
at risk of carbon leakage. While the first group of sectors identified on the basis
of the single carbon intensive threshold (i.e. 30% or higher carbon intensity) can
be considered at risk of carbon leakage, the two other groups were identified on
the basis of ill-adapted thresholds. The single trade exposure threshold (i.e. 30%
or higher trade exposure) is the most problematic. It led to the inclusion of a
group of 118 sectors in the list.83 Yet, high trade exposure is not necessarily
indicative of a risk of carbon leakage, especially when carbon intensity is low
and products from a sector are highly differentiated. Therefore, some of these
sectors will be able to pass through the costs of allowances on international
markets, generating windfall profits. The last group composed of 27 sectors was
listed as “at risk” on the basis of carbon intensity combined with trade exposure
thresholds (i.e. more than 5% and 10% respectively). However, these thresholds
are not high enough to justify a risk of carbon leakage. Other specific factors
such as market concentration, abatement potential, institutional factors and
profit margins can also determine vulnerability to carbon leakage. Therefore, it
not sure that these sectors are actually at risk or that other sectors at the margin
of the thresholds will not contribute to carbon leakage.84
A qualitative analysis would have been key for taking into account the differ-
ences between sectors and analysing the exact nature of the risk. However, the
qualitative analysis foreseen in the revised Directive does not aim to remove
from the list certain sectors whose characteristics would have revealed that they
80. S. CLO, “Grandfathering, auctioning and Carbon Leakage: Assessing the inconsistencies of the new
ETS Directive”, Energy Policy, n°38, 2010; S. DRÖGE and S. COOPER, “Tackling leakage in a world of une-
qual carbon prices – A study for the Greens/EFA Group”, Climate Strategies, May 2010; R. MARTIN, M.
MUÛLS AND U. J. WAGNER, Policy Brief: Still time to reclaim the European Union Emissions Trading Sys-
tem for the European tax payer, LSE, Imperial College London, Univesidad Carlos III de Madrid, 2010.
81. Commission Decision 2010/2/EU, op. cit.
82. S. DRÖGE and S. COOPER, op. cit.
83. S. CLO, “Grandfathering, auctioning and Carbon Leakage: Assessing the inconsistencies of the new
ETS Directive”, Energy Policy, n°38, 2010, p. 2426.
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were not at risk. Instead, it is used to determine whether other sectors should be
added on the list.
In a nutshell, it is likely that free allocation of allowances will cause trouble.
Many sectors will receive free emission allowances while not facing an actual
risk of relocation outside the EU. Consequently, some sectors could face higher
constraints than others relative to their responsibility for emissions, creating
new distortions of competition. Moreover, despite the fact that the benchmarks
will force most of the installations eligible for free allocation to buy some of
their allowances, some of these installations which are able to pass-through the
allowance price will still benefit from important windfall profits. According to
Martin et al., industries deemed to be at risk of carbon leakage will be able to
receive about € 7 billion of windfall profits annually.85
It is essential to note that this analysis does not reflect the consequences of the
recent economic and political situation. In its Communication of May 2010, the
Commission has recognised that the financial crisis has had important conse-
quences for the carbon leakage debate.86 On the one hand, the fact that the
carbon price has been inferior to what had been initially expected has signifi-
cantly decreased the EU ETS impact on sectors’ competitiveness. In the Commis-
sion’s assessments to draw up the list of sectors deemed to be at risk, a price of
€ 30/tonne of greenhouse gas was used which is about twice today’s price. This
overstated the risk of carbon leakage for many sectors. On the other hand, it has
been seen that energy-intensive sectors will carry forward a significant amount
of unused allowances into the third period, easing their future carbon costs. For
instance, the surpluses of the steel and cement sectors for the second period have
been estimated to about 127 million tonnes for steel, which is 35% more than
its 2009 emissions, and 164 million tonnes for cement, which is 8% more than
its 2009 emissions (without taking into account offset credits).87
Accordingly, in the same Communication, the Commission estimated the risk of
carbon leakage of the EU’s 20% target to be less than 1%, with the chemicals
and fertiliser sectors “hardest hit”. Moreover, in case of a move towards a 30%
target, the impact would remain limited. The Commission estimated that fer-
rous and non-ferrous metals, chemical products and other energy intensive
industries would entail extra production losses of around 1% compared to the
20% target.88
85. R. MARTIN, M. MUÛLS AND U. J. WAGNER, op. cit., p. 1.
86. Communication from the Commission, COM (2010) 265 final, op. cit.
87. D. MORRIS and B. WORTHINGTON, Cap or trap? How the EU ETS risks locking-in carbon emissions,
Sandbag, September 2010, p. 47.
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Despite these arguments, the Commission has considered that the measures to
prevent carbon leakage “remain justified at present” given that the conclusion
of a comprehensive global climate agreement is still uncertain.89 Such an agree-
ment would be the best solution against carbon leakage as it would create a level
playing field between countries.
5.3. Uncertainty of the rules regarding the use of 
offset credits
Although several changes have been introduced in the revised directive, uncer-
tainties regarding key issues on the use of offset credits remain.
Quantitatively, the new restrictions on the use of credits are actually not so dif-
ferent from Phase II. The limit of 50% of mitigation effort over 2008-2020
echoes the ceiling established by the Commission for Phase II and removes the
legal uncertainty created by the reference to the ‘supplementarity’ principle.
Although this time the cap is more stringent, this limit remains generous. With
respect to the level of credits for installations, they will be able to use credits up
to either the amount allowed in Phase II or an amount of at least 11% of their
allocation in Phase II. This will reduce to some extent the differences between
Member States’ NAPs in phase II.
While the recourse to offset credits for Phase III was already significant after the
revision of the directive, it has become an important impediment to the effi-
ciency of the future scheme with the consequences of the global recession. It has
been estimated that some 1.2 billion of unused offset credits from Phase II could
remain available for use in Phase III.90 Such a surplus of credits is expected not
only to largely substitute domestic abatement, but also to reduce the carbon
price. This prolonged use of such low-cost reductions in the scheme will also
slow down innovation and affect the compliance with the EU’s 2020 targets for
renewable and energy efficiency. The move towards a 30% reduction target
could already greatly address these issues by reducing the supply of allowances
by 1.4 billion as proposed by the Commission.
In the event the EU decides to move towards a 30% reduction target, the import
limit on credits would change. The initial Commission proposal for a revised
89. Ibidem.
90. D. MORRIS and B. WORTHINGTON, op. cit., p. 19. This amount consists of some 820 million unused
offset credits from Phase II and a further 380 million offset credits which are expected to be made availa-
ble in Phase III.THE EU’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: ACHIEVEMENTS, KEY LESSONS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
39
directive planned to increase the use of credits up to 50% of the additional
efforts. However, this generous scenario is only indicative. Since then, the
impact of the global recession has greatly changed the situation. The move
towards a 30% reduction scenario would be thus a good opportunity to revise
the limits on the number of offset credits available for use in order to encourage
more domestic reduction efforts.
On the quality side, in the absence of a global agreement, credits will have to be
swapped with allowances. This measure allows operators of installations to be
certain that they may use CDM and JI credits after the end of the Kyoto Protocol
period in 2012 and reduces the downward pressure of the credit prices on the
allowance prices.
Although the majority of credits used in the third period will be credits regis-
tered before 2013, the revised directive allows a limited additional quantity of
credits from projects started after 2013 in Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
and from countries that have entered into bilateral agreements with the EU.
Considering that the EU occupies most of the global credits market, this meas-
ure should help to correct the uneven distribution of projects in the world in the
absence of a global agreement. The EU’s strategy is two-fold. On the one hand,
it wants to focus the CDM on LDCs so as to favour financial transfers to coun-
tries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change and responsible for a very
low level of GHG emissions. On the other hand, the possibility of concluding
bilateral agreements with third countries should also allow the EU to substitute
part of the demand for CDM credits with credits from the new sectoral carbon
market mechanism. This sectoral mechanism credits emissions reductions from
a whole sector on the basis of an ambitious threshold. This should scale-up
investments in green technologies in advanced developing countries.
Regarding the environmental and economic integrity of future CDM project
types, the revised directive does not foresee any qualitative restrictions. How-
ever, it states that measures may be applied from 2013 onwards. The absence of
any new restrictions has created uncertainty on what credits the EU ETS will
accept in Phase III. Nevertheless, in November 2010, the Commission released
a proposal to introduce further quality restrictions on the use of CDM credits
from industrial gas projects in Phase III.91 Specifically, the proposal provides
that the use of CDM/JI credits from projects involving the destruction of HFC
and N2O is prohibited from 2013 onwards in the EU ETS. These restrictions
91. European Commission, Draft Commission Regulation of determining, pursuant to Directive 2003/87/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, certain restrictions applicable to the use of interna-
tional credits from projects involving industrial gases. Available on: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/docs/
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seem essential to reduce the entry into the EU ETS of credits from projects entail-
ing unacceptable environment and social impacts. Yet, there is a risk of ex-post
adjustment of eligibility criteria for existing credits that could undermine the
efficiency of the market.
5.4. Opportunity of linking up with other ETSs
The revision of the ETS Directive reflects the EU’s will to move towards a global
carbon market. In this context, the European Commission’s objective is to
develop a carbon market among Member States of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) by 2015 and to extend this to the
big emerging countries from around 2020.92
The revised Directive offers the possibility of linking up the EU ETS with any
other ETS in the world and no longer only with developed countries having
ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Moreover, the amendments include two new con-
ditions in order to insure a minimum harmonisation between the schemes
linked. Firstly, linking may only be considered with mandatory systems in order
to preserve the environmental integrity of the scheme and to avoid a risk of
competitive distortions. Secondly, linking must take place with schemes that
have  absolute emissions caps. Thereby, a certain stringency of the caps is
required so as to impose a binding constraint on emissions93 and avoid signif-
icant distributional issues regarding the gains between countries or regions.
Furthermore, the Directive states that schemes linked together must be compat-
ible. The examination of this compatibility criterion takes into account the level
of environmental ambition and the establishment of a robust and comparable
emissions monitoring, reporting and verification mechanism and compliance
system. This should be done on a case-by-case basis by the Commission in
consultation with Council committees when deciding whether or not to link
with another ETS.
So far, the likelihood of the achievement of the rapid linking ambitions of the
EU is highly uncertain. In the US – the first candidate for linking with the EU
ETS – the adoption of the Waxman Bill regulating the implementation of a fed-
eral cap and trade system seems unlikely to occur anytime soon. To make the
situation worse, the negotiations on the adoption of a national scheme in Aus-
tralia are also stalled. Nevertheless, systems have been recently implemented in
92. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, International climate policy post-Copen-
hagen: Acting now to reinvigorate global action on climate change, COM (2010) 86 final, 9 March 2010.
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two sub-federal entities. In the North-East of the United States94, the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) has been operating since September 2008. In
Japan, the Kyoto Metropolitan Government has just started a cap and trade
system in April 2010 and a national system is being envisaged.
Regarding developing countries, it has been seen that the Commission’s strategy
is two-fold95: to propose a substantial reform of the CDM, which should mainly
focus on Least Developed Countries (LDCs); and, to promote the development
of sectoral carbon market mechanisms in economically more advanced coun-
tries, whose credits could be recognised for use in the EU ETS and the emerging
OECD-wide carbon market. In order to do so, the revised Directive provides the
possibility to conclude non-binding arrangements with third countries to pro-
vide for administrative and technical coordination in relation to allowances in
the EU ETS. These sectoral crediting mechanisms are considered to be the last
significant stepping stone before the adoption of a cap-and-trade system. Cur-
rently, developing countries such as China, India and the Republic of Korea are
seriously considering such market mechanisms.
The International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) will help the EU to develop
its ambitions.96 Created in 2007, ICAP is a partnership between the European
Commission, several EU Member States, US States, Canadian provinces, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, Norway and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Its
objective is to contribute to the creation of a well-functioning global carbon
market. It will do this by allowing governments and public authorities that are
engaged in the process of designing or implementing ETSs to share best practice,
build partnerships and discuss design compatibility issues before making possi-
ble future linking of carbon markets.
In the future, it would be good that the potential international climate agree-
ment provides for key ETS features as well as for the mutual recognition of
allowances across ETSs in order to establish the basic design on which the global
carbon market could be built.
94. Maine, Maryland, Massachussets, New Jersey and New York.
95. Communication from the Commission, COM (2010) 86 final, op. cit.
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5.5. Remaining uncertainties and lack of price 
incentive for green investments
The revised Directive addressed most of the design’s shortcomings inducing
uncertainty and price volatility within the EU ETS by making the regulatory
framework as stable and predictable as possible. Important improvements in
this respect are: the linear reduction of the cap known long in advance and set
at the EU level, the remaining possibility of banking allowances, the longer trad-
ing period of 8 years more adapted to investment cycles and the increasing use
of auctioning.
However, some important and inevitable uncertainties remain outside the regu-
latory framework of the scheme, undermining the development and diffusion of
new technologies. A major part of uncertainty stems from the remaining absence
of an international climate agreement upon which would depend some impor-
tant aspects of the revised Directive (e.g. the move towards a 30% reduction
target, the extent of the measures to address carbon leakage or the quantitative
and qualitative restrictions on the use of credits from CDM and JI). Moreover,
it has been seen that the ambition of linking the EU ETS with other trading
schemes is highly uncertain, depending on evolutions outside the EU. Finally,
future economic growth prospects remain uncertain due to the global recession.
This should keep affecting investment decisions and the demand of allowances.
The recession has significantly undermined the improvements brought by the
revised Directive. In its Communication of May 2010, the Commission
acknowledged that the carbon price is likely to remain low after 2012 because
of the huge surplus of allowances banked forward into the future.97 Whereas the
impact assessment of 2008 foresaw a carbon price of around € 32 in case of full
implementation of the climate package, new estimates project a carbon price of
€ 16 in 2020.98 Yet, such a price does not provide enough incentive for busi-
nesses to invest in new green technologies. Thereby, the achievement of the EU’s
2020 targets for renewables and energy efficiency is highly uncertain. Investing
in renewables is expensive. In order to make investment in renewables profita-
ble, the carbon price should reach $38 for onshore wind energy, $136 for off-
shore and $196 for solar cells.99 Therefore, in the short and medium term it is
not the EU ETS but more public financial support which will efficiently contrib-
ute to the achievement of the 20% target of renewable energy.
97. Communication from the Commission, COM (2010) 265 final, op. cit.
98. Ibidem.
99. Equivalent to respectively € 28,5, € 102, € 147 in the New Energy Finance website: http://www.new-
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The impact of the recession on the carbon price is also expected to halve gov-
ernment revenue from auctioning.100 With the pressure on public finances, it is
therefore very likely that Member States will not comply with their non-binding
agreement of spending at least half of auction revenue to tackle climate change
The revised directive introduced two new mechanisms in order to address vola-
tility when the price evolution does not reflect market fundamentals. The first
mechanism foresees the intervention of the Commission to ensure protection in
the event of speculation and manipulation. The EU ETS experience has shown
that important variables such as oil and natural gas price changes can greatly
influence carbon prices, raising opportunities of market manipulation. The sec-
ond mechanism is presented by the Commission as a mechanism to respond to
excessive price fluctuations. However, it only prevents the price from rising too
high by bringing forward the auctioning of future allowances or by auctioning
a part of the new entrant reserve in order to increase allowance supply without
influencing the emission cap. Nothing has been foreseen for preventing the car-
bon price from falling too low, which has been the main problem so far. There-
fore, although the efficiency of these mechanisms is yet to be tested, it is likely
they will not be sufficient to protect the EU ETS against new external factors
enhancing uncertainty and volatility.
To reduce the risk of large price fluctuations, several scholars101 developed the
idea of control mechanisms through a price floor and/or a price cap (or “safety
valve”). Like a tax, this would reduce the short-term cost uncertainty while
maintaining the long-term perspective of an ETS. Such a hybrid system has how-
ever not been very successful with the Commission which considers that limits
on prices could unduly interfere with the market. Moreover, in absence of price
harmonisation, these control mechanisms could be problematic in the case of
linking with other schemes if one of the other schemes has not foreseen such
measures.
Though little experienced so far, the possibility of linking up ETSs also reduces
price volatility. The impact of shocks in a region or country is mitigated through
the extension of the area covered which offers more abatement options. On the
other hand, the shocks could also become more frequent as the scheme is no
more protected against developments in other regions.102
100. Communication from the Commission, COM (2010) 265 final, op. cit.
101. K. NEUHOFF, M. GRUBB, J.-C. HOURCADE, and F. MATTHES, EU ETS Post 2012: Submission to the
EU Review, Climate Strategies, University of Cambridge, CIRED, Öko-Institute e.V., 6 July 2007; Price
Waterhouse Coopers, “Carbon Taxes vs Carbon Trading. Pros, cons and the case for a hybrid approach”,
march 2009.
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In the shorter term, the main measure the EU could take to have a direct impact
on the carbon price is to move towards a 30% reduction target. If the EU wants
to drive the economy towards a low-carbon path, the current target of a 20%
reduction is clearly insufficient. In its Communication of May 2010, the Com-
mission acknowledged that a 30% target would not only be “technically feasible
but also economically affordable.” As a result of the economic crisis, making the
additional effort to reach 30% would now cost € 81 billion. This represents a
figure just € 11 billion higher than what the EU had originally agreed upon to
reach its 20% target in 2008.103 Moreover, it is without counting the price tag
that would involve the delayed action of a 20% target. According to the Inter-
national Energy Agency, every year of delayed investment in low-carbon tech-
nologies has a global cost ranging from € 300 to 400 billion.104
Although the Commission supports a unilateral move to a 30% objective, it also
recognises in its analysis that the current political conditions are not favourable.
At the international level, the shift depends on progress in international negoti-
ations towards a new global climate agreement. At the EU level, it was agreed
by the Council of Ministers105 that the Commission should further analyse the
economic consequences for each Member State before taking such action. Nev-
ertheless, in July 2010, a joint statement by the British, French and German
environment ministers called for a unilateral move towards a 30% target.106
Although the new Eastern Member States are deeply resistant to further action
on climate, the EU’s climate commissioner, Denmark, Ireland and a group of
leading European businesses have now all backed the call for a stronger target.
They claim this would not be difficult and would prevent Europe from lagging
behind in the global race for green technology.
At a time when competing economies like China, Japan, and the US are rapidly
embracing the race to compete in new green technologies, it is paramount for
the EU to boost its incentives to research, develop and deploy new technologies
if it wants to remain at the forefront of the fight against climate change. Recent
research from Bloomberg New Energy Finance showed that China has over-
taken the EU in green technology investment. From mid-2009 to mid-2010,
China has attracted $ 40.3 billion in asset financing for new clean energy capac-
ity, compared with $ 29.3 billion in the EU.107
103. Communication from the Commission, COM (2010) 265 final, op. cit.
104. N. TANAKA, The IEA contribution: A blueprint to deliver on ambitious climate change goals, IEA, 14
December 2009, p. 6.
105. Council of Ministers of 11 June 2010
106. F. HARVEY, “Ministers toughen stance on emissions”, Financial Times, 14 July 2010.
107. S. FEINBERG, Powered by China, Clean Energy Investment holds steady in Q2 2010, Bloomberg New
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While the long-term success of the EU ETS in developing more stable and higher
carbon prices in order to provide incentives for innovation and development of
clean technologies is uncertain, it is central that the EU continues to develop a
complementary mix of policy instruments, including subsidies for the research
and development of new technologies, taxation of non-ETS sectors, voluntary
agreements, performance standards, as well as information instruments to
encourage changes in behaviour and green public procurement.47
6. Conclusion: Looking forward on the basis 
of lessons learnt
Theoretically, an ETS enables the achievement of any environmental goal in an
economically efficient manner by reducing carbon emissions at least costs.
Moreover, it is supposed to provide incentives for investments in green technol-
ogies and penalises high-carbon options, leading to further reductions of emis-
sions and an increasing carbon price over time. However, the EU ETS has not
yet been able to realise its theoretical potential. As a matter of fact, the first
phase is considered as a ‘learning by doing’ period and the second phase has
turned out to be a period of global economic recession. It seems thus too soon
to actually determine the efficiency of the instrument.
Nevertheless, the EU ETS’ achievements are not negligible. It has created a func-
tioning carbon market which has grown considerably over time, both in terms
of volume and value of transactions. Businesses in the covered sectors have
increasingly taken into account the carbon price in their corporate behaviour.
New business opportunities linked to the scheme have been created. And last
but not least, many studies recognise that the EU ETS achieved emissions abate-
ment during the first phase. Moreover, it is already clear that the EU will more
than comply with its Kyoto target at a cost of less than 0,1% of its GDP. As the
EU ETS covers about 40% of total GHG emissions in the EU, the share of the
scheme in the Kyoto target achievement is not negligible. However, it is likely
that the significant emissions reductions resulting from the economic crisis will
have left very little room for abatement efforts in the EU.
Although the EU ETS has managed to create a functioning carbon market, it did
not succeed in providing a stable and effective carbon price so far. This is to a
large extent due to the fact that the scheme has been undermined by some seri-
ous design shortcomings which can be largely attributed to the fear of negative
macroeconomic impacts from Member States. Firstly, the decentralised charac-
ter of the scheme has allowed Member States to retain sovereignty on the
amount of allowances and the way they are allocated. This has not only caused
over-allocation and low carbon prices but has also created inequalities between
industries in different countries. Furthermore, while there is an economic ration-
ale to auction allowances, free allocation was heavily favoured. Experience has
shown that this allocation methodology has caused undue distributional effects,
especially huge windfall profits for the power sector and some industrial sectors.
Finally, generous access to credits from offsetting projects was also granted to
satisfy some Member States despite many strong arguments to restrain their use.THE EU’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: ACHIEVEMENTS, KEY LESSONS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
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Some of these concerns have been addressed in Phase II through marginal
improvements and the Commission’s revision of national allocation plans.
When analysing the revised Directive 2009/29/EC, it is clear that the lessons
from the first years of experience have been taken into account as most of the
design concerns have been addressed. The linear reduction of the cap established
at EU level and the longer trading period will increase the long-term predictabil-
ity of the scheme. The increased use of auctioning as the rule and the slow phas-
ing out of free allocation based on benchmarks will tackle many of the design
shortcomings of the first periods, including the windfall profits, the inequalities
between industries of different countries, and the treatment of new entrants and
closures in the scheme.
Still, the revised Directive does not remove all design concerns. Although it tried
to adjust the allocation methodologies according to each sector’s features, free
allocation will keep creating unfair competitive advantages for some industries
in Phase III. The criteria chosen to identify the industries that will receive free
allocation in the third phase are not restrictive enough. This will allow many
industries to receive 100% of allowances free of charge up to 2020, while not
facing an actual risk of carbon leakage. It is even truer in the aftermath of the
economic crisis. Energy-intensive industries will carry over a significant amount
of unused allowances and credits to Phase III, easing their future carbon costs.
Moreover, some energy-intensive industries, able to pass on carbon costs, will
continue to benefit from windfall profits. However, benchmarking will signifi-
cantly reduce these profits as all emissions above the level of the benchmark will
not be compensated for free of charge.
The revised Directive has restrained the use of offset credits but not enough.
Quantitatively, the limit on the use of offset credits has been set quite generously.
With the recession though, the surpluses of credits from Phase II carried over
into Phase III could discourage domestic reductions for the years to come. Qual-
itatively, the restrictions introduced in the Directive could promote sustainable
development through CDM projects in least developed countries, while encour-
aging abatement in emerging countries through sectoral trading schemes linked
to the EU ETS. Besides, the Commission has recently submitted a proposal to
introduce further quality restrictions on the use of some CDM credits. Such
restrictions should reduce the entry into the EU ETS of credits from projects
environmentally and socially damaging. However, there is a risk of ex-post
adjustment of eligibility criteria for existing credits that could undermine the
efficiency of the market.THE EU’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: ACHIEVEMENTS, KEY LESSONS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
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The recession has greatly undermined the EU ETS with a risk of long-term dam-
aging effects. The large surpluses of credits and allowances from Phase II will
inflate the Phase III cap, threatening the very purpose of the scheme, which is to
create scarcity on the quantity of emission allowances in order to force emission
reductions. It has been estimated that emissions in the EU could grow with no
need for domestic abatement until 2017.108 Moreover, these surpluses of allow-
ances and credits are expected to maintain a low carbon price in Phase III. This
low carbon price will not be sufficient to drive innovation and investments in
green technologies. Although, the EU needs a credible carbon price if it wants to
keep its front-runner position and ensure the transition towards a low-carbon
society.
In order to correct the harmful effects of the recession, it is necessary that the
EU moves quickly towards a 30% reduction target by 2020, without waiting for
an international climate agreement. Not only would it not be expensive but it
would also direct the EU economy onto a low-carbon path, with a huge poten-
tial for growth creation largely compensating the costs.
As the first experience of carbon trading in the world, the EU ETS has drawn
many important lessons for its future and for the future of other potential ETS
designs in third countries. However, due to the global economic recession and
the remaining uncertainties at the international level, the actual future potential
of the EU ETS is still unclear. Therefore, it appears a wise approach to continue
developing a mix of different tailored instruments to tackle climate change in
conjunction with the EU ETS.
108. D. MORRIS and B. WORTHINGTON, op. cit.